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Executive Compensation Disclosure in Emerging Markets with Weak Shareholder Enforcement: A Multilevel Analysis

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4778300
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Executive remuneration and the limits of disclosure as an instrument of corporate governance
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Disclosure for whom? Government involvement, CSR disclosure and firm value
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Executive compensation incentives, risk level and corporate innovation
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The enhanced disclosure of executive compensation in Korea
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The Relationship Between the Comprehensiveness of Corporate Annual Reports and Firm Characteristics in Spain
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Market Reactions to the Regulation of Executive Compensation
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Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
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Does Sensationalism Affect Executive Compensation? Evidence from Pay Ratio Disclosure Reform
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CEO Risk Incentives and Corporate Cash Holdings
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inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1177/0148558x19846735openalex-extracted
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inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1177/0312896214550531openalex-extracted
Agency costs, executive incentives and corporate financial decisions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1177/031289629101600103openalex-extracted
Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns
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Executive Pensions, Compensation Leverage, and Firm Risk
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Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence
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