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Inefficient rushes in auctions

https://doi.org/10.3982/te2513
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0780openalex-snapshot
A Sealed-Bid Auction That Matches the English Auction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0156-9openalex-snapshot
Survival auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90144-sopenalex-snapshot
Equilibria in open common value auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.10.009openalex-snapshot
Hybrid auctions revisited
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.09.016openalex-snapshot
On the optimality of not allocating
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.12.004openalex-snapshot
Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.04.003openalex-snapshot
Second best efficiency and the English auction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.001openalex-snapshot
English auctions and the Stolper–Samuelson theorem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.05.009openalex-snapshot
On efficiency of the English auction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(00)00057-xopenalex-snapshot
Auctions, development, and privatization: Efficient auctions with liquidity-constrained buyers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(97)00123-2openalex-snapshot
Auctions with almost common values: The `Wallet Game' and its applications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00074-7openalex-snapshot
Asymmetric English auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(02)00140-4openalex-snapshot
Hybrid auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s1138-5758(09)70039-8openalex-snapshot
Handbook of European Financial Markets and Institutions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261919openalex-snapshot
Rational Frenzies and Crashes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00240openalex-snapshot
Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00020openalex-snapshot
The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02213.xopenalex-snapshot
Optimal Privatisation using Qualifying Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.xopenalex-snapshot
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2492002.2482557openalex-snapshot
Peaches, lemons, and cookies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/003355300554755openalex-snapshot
Efficient Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/0895330027166openalex-snapshot
What Really Matters in Auction Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911865openalex-snapshot
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10592openalex-snapshot
On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4863255openalex-extracted
Feedback and Competition in Procurement e-Auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01498-wopenalex-snapshot
I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00337-7openalex-snapshot
Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese–English auction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.003openalex-snapshot
On the efficiency of the first price auction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102623openalex-snapshot
Optimal equity auction with interdependent valuations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1556/2065.182.2021.2.9openalex-snapshot
Árverések – elmélettől a gyakorlatig: a 2020-as közgazdasági Nobel-emlékdíjról • Auctions – from Theory to Applications: On the 2020 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3390/g13040050openalex-snapshot
Promoting Entry and Efficiency via Reserve Prices
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