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Efficient Mechanism Design with Distributional Objectives and Ties
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inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2553openalex-snapshot
House Allocation with Existing Tenants
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03994-2openalex-snapshot
Matrices and Matroids for Systems Analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0713-3openalex-snapshot
An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0820-4openalex-snapshot
Two simple variations of top trading cycles
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90033-0openalex-snapshot
On cores and indivisibility
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.05.004openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.017openalex-snapshot
The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.12.006openalex-snapshot
Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.03.006openalex-snapshot
A Characterization of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism for the School Choice Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa071openalex-snapshot
The Cutoff Structure of Top Trading Cycles in School Choice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac002openalex-snapshot
The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12335openalex-snapshot
THE EQUITABLE TOP TRADING CYCLES MECHANISM FOR SCHOOL CHOICE
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975482.15openalex-snapshot
Assignment Mechanisms under Distributional Constraints
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764501openalex-snapshot
Designing Matching Mechanisms under General Distributional Constraints
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3485447.3512057openalex-snapshot
Almost (Weighted) Proportional Allocations for Indivisible Chores✱✱
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3543507.3583398openalex-snapshot
Towards Fair Allocation in Social Commerce Platforms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597716openalex-snapshot
Efficient Market Design with Distributional Objectives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3589334.3645613openalex-snapshot
Fair Surveillance Assignment Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3670865.3673527openalex-snapshot
Efficient and Strategy-proof Mechanism under General Constraints
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20101552openalex-snapshot
Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20210096openalex-snapshot
Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3376openalex-snapshot
Optimizing for Distributional Goals in School Choice Problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v26i1.8239openalex-snapshot
Housing Markets with Indifferences: A Tale of Two Mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te2195openalex-snapshot
Improving matching under hard distributional constraints
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te2717openalex-snapshot
Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.65109/bexi1298openalex-snapshot
On Stable Matchings with Pairwise Preferences and Matroid Constraints
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.65109/iyfl3561openalex-snapshot
Efficient Allocation Mechanism with Endowments and Distributional Constraints
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