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Individual versus Team Production with Social Preferences

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4835900
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/msj.20129openalex-extracted
Teaching Teamwork in Medical Education
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Envy, comparison costs, and the economic theory of the firm
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Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(94)90026-4openalex-extracted
Repeated moral hazard: The role of memory, commitment, and the access to credit markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(94)00601-wopenalex-extracted
The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(94)00383-gopenalex-extracted
On the interrelation between production technology, job design, and incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-7187(93)90037-dopenalex-extracted
Moral hazard with several agents
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.12.007openalex-extracted
Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2011.01.029openalex-extracted
Relative performance or team evaluation? Optimal contracts for other-regarding agents
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2009.10.002openalex-extracted
The intensity of incentives in firms and markets: Moral hazard with envious agents
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4101(96)00446-6openalex-extracted
Teams, repeated tasks, and implicit incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511610240.008openalex-extracted
Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity: Evidence and Economic Applications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/ccol0521340446.003openalex-extracted
The theory of contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230522343_6openalex-extracted
Moral Hazard, Contracts and Social Preferences: A Survey
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261010openalex-extracted
Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261153openalex-extracted
A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261616openalex-extracted
Pay Equality and Industrial Politics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261677openalex-extracted
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261840openalex-extracted
Peer Pressure and Partnerships
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/262082openalex-extracted
Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/15.1.56openalex-extracted
Informal authority in organizations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24openalex-extracted
Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewm037openalex-extracted
Optimal Contracts When a Worker Envies His Boss
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036907openalex-extracted
Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a037011openalex-extracted
Cooperation versus Competition in Agency
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a037041openalex-extracted
Cooperation in Hierarchical Organizations: An Incentive Perspective
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00083openalex-extracted
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12131openalex-extracted
Other‐regarding principal and moral hazard: The single‐agent case
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00129.xopenalex-extracted
PIECE‐RATE CONTRACTS FOR OTHER‐REGARDING WORKERS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2008.00540.xopenalex-extracted
Inequity Aversion and Team Incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5876.2004.00273.xopenalex-extracted
Moral Hazard and Other‐Regarding Preferences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302753399445openalex-extracted
Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/003355399556151openalex-extracted
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.1.166openalex-extracted
ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.3.525openalex-extracted
Optimal Incentives for Teams
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1014030openalex-extracted
Relative Performance or Team Evaluation? Optimal Contracts for Other-Regarding Agents
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2874177openalex-extracted
Organization Design, Proximity, and Productivity Responses to Upward Social Comparison
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.628044openalex-extracted
Do Co-Workers' Wages Matter? Theory and Evidence on Wage Secrecy, Wage Compression and Effort
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.756409openalex-extracted
Optimal Incentive Contracts Under Inequity Aversion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.779384openalex-extracted
Optimal Contracts When Agents Envy Each Other
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1885099openalex-extracted
Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912562openalex-extracted
Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2118358openalex-extracted
Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2171943openalex-extracted
Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2297432openalex-extracted
Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2938221openalex-extracted
Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003457openalex-extracted
Moral Hazard in Teams
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003535openalex-extracted
Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvcm4j8j.15openalex-extracted
Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics
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