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Strategic Flexibility and the Optimality of Pay for Sector Performance

https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhp118
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

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inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.11.007openalex-snapshot
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inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(97)00028-7openalex-snapshot
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inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/250051openalex-snapshot
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inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261677openalex-snapshot
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inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhm049openalex-snapshot
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inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhn099openalex-snapshot
What Matters in Corporate Governance?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00180openalex-snapshot
Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00476openalex-snapshot
Explaining the Diversification Discount
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00577openalex-snapshot
Incentive Compensation When Executives Can Hedge the Market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03808.xopenalex-snapshot
On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00674.xopenalex-snapshot
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inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/00335530152466269openalex-snapshot
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inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.885531openalex-snapshot
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inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003457openalex-snapshot
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Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence ✶ ✶We thank Aubrey Clark, Fabrizio Ferri, Carola Frydman, Tom Gosling, Steve Kaplan, Gaizka Ormazabal, Kelly Shue, Alexander Wagner, David Zhang, and especially Pierre Chaigneau for helpful comments and Janet Chater, Irem Erten, Jesus Gorrin,…
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.34989/swp-2016-12openalex-snapshot
Capital Structure, Pay Structure and Job Termination
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.46827/ejhrms.v6i1.1281openalex-snapshot
BOARD OF DIRECTORS' PREFERRED ATTRIBUTES OF A COOPERATIVE MANAGER: MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES CONTEXT
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.53846/goediss-4442openalex-snapshot
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.5547/01956574.41.6.ldavopenalex-snapshot
Are Energy Executives Rewarded for Luck?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.69864/ijbsam.6-3.74openalex-snapshot
A Perspective for Supply Chain Management: Building a Conceptual Framework
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.69864/ijbsam.6-3.76openalex-snapshot
The institutional determinants of CEO compensation: An international empirical evidence
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